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This paper evaluates the effects of financial globalization on growth and macroeconomic 
volatility, from 1984 to 2003, for a sample of 43 countries. Particular attention is given to 
those effects on the member countries of the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR): 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The findings show that 
financial globalization spurs growth, when the countries’ income level is controlled; it does 
not increase macroeconomic volatility, as it is commonly stated, but does not reduce it 
either. Belonging to FLAR does not seem to make a difference in terms of growth and 
macroeconomic volatility; however, the findings of a strong negative effect on the volatility 
of consumption might be related to the fact that those countries have an insurer (FLAR) 
that has helped them to smooth consumption during periods of adverse external shocks.      
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of financial globalization on economic 
growth and volatility of output, income, consumption, and investment, of a sample of 43 
countries from 1984 to 2003.
1 Particular attention is given to the member countries of the 
Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR): Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela. 
 
In theory, financial globalization, and particularly, capital flows, increases efficiency and 
productivity in the real (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Stulz, 1999) and financial (Levine, 
1996, 1997) sectors; permits smoothing consumption and investment through international 
risk sharing (Sach, 1981; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996); promotes macroeconomic discipline 
(Obsfeld, 1998); reduces macroeconomic volatility (Razin and Rose, 1994; Sutherland; 
1996; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2000); and as consequence promotes growth 
(MacDougall, 1968; Kemp and Liviatan, 1973; McKinnon, 1973; Hanson, 1974; Frenkel, 
1976; Grossman and Heplman, 1991; Levine, 1997; Klein, 2005).
2 Notwithstanding, 
financial globalization may have costs, as summarized by Agénor (2003, p. 1096-1101), 
such as concentration of capital flows in certain groups of countries, misallocation of 
resources, loss of macroeconomic stability (inflation pressures, real exchange rate 
appreciation, external imbalances, etc.), contagion, and risk of sharp reversal of capital 
flows.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
of the Banco de la República or FLAR’s. He is the sole responsible for any errors of omission or commission. 
Author’ e-mail address: hrincon@flar.net or hrincoca@banrep.gov.co. 
1 Financial globalization is understood here as the situation where international capital markets are more 
integrated as a consequence of countries’ dismantling capital restrictions and controls on capital flows, 
favorable interest differentials, liberalization of domestic financial markets, international diversification of 
risk, trade liberalizations, better economic environments and institutions, and cyclical push (or external) 
factors.  Appendix A.1 lists the sample countries. 
2 Three recent broad theoretical and empirical discussions on financial globalization and its macroeconomic 
effects are found in  Agénor (2003), Eichengreen (2003) and Prasad et. al. (2004). 
   3
In practice, countries have imposed, with varying degrees of intensity and span, restrictions 
and controls on capital flows. The expected benefits of these policies are related mainly to 
macroeconomic stability, in terms of lower volatility of output, consumption, and 
employment. The costs are associated with the administrative difficulties in managing the 
regime and the negative economic consequences derived from the protectionism provided 
to the domestic financial sector. The realization of those benefits and costs has been 
conditioned to the effectiveness of the isolation of the economy from capital flows, which 
is not always the case. 
 
The findings of the voluminous empirical literature about financial globalization’s potential 
benefits to economic growth are mixed.
3 Rodrik’s (1998) paper may be the most well 
known and cited study on this issue. It shows there is not a relationship between capital 
flows and growth. On the contrary, Quinn’s (1997) paper, another broadly quoted study, 
finds a positive relationship between the change in his measure of restrictions to the capital 
account and growth. From the twelve papers documented by Edison et al. (2004, Table 6), 
six of them found that capital account openness raises growth significantly. The others do 
not support this hypothesis.  
 
Many findings differ depending on whether the data refers to high-income countries or to 
low-income nations. For example, Edwards (2001) found support for the hypothesis of a 
positive relationship for the former countries, while he rejects it in the case of the latter 
ones. On the other hand, Quinn (1997) and Bekaert et al. (2001) show evidence that 
financial globalization endorses growth in low-income countries. Edison (2004, p. 1-2) and 
Klein (2005) showed that when institutional variables are included in growth regression 
models, the effect of the financial globalization is washed out. However, they argued that, 
when regression models allow for institutional and nonlinearities on the explanatory 
variables, the responsiveness of growth rises. Their results are poor, though, since a 
statistically significant effect is shown only for one-quarter of the countries in the sample. 
                                                       
3 Excellent reviews are found in Edison et al. (2002), Edison et al. (2004), and Prasad et al. (2004).   4
In addition, where there is positive evidence, it is for middle-income countries, but not for 
poorer or richer ones. Mora and Rincón (2006), using data of FLAR member countries, 
middle-income countries according to the World Bank classification, found that, in general, 
capital controls neither reduce growth nor reduce macroeconomic volatility. On the 
contrary, and as expected, financial globalization promotes growth.  
 
In summary, “while financial globalization can, in theory, help to promote economic 
growth through various channels, there is not as yet robust empirical evidence that this 
causal relationship is quantitatively very important” (Prasad et al., 2004, p. 5). 
   
Regarding the evidence of the effects of financial globalization on macroeconomic 
volatility, the empirical literature is limited. Moreover, it focuses mostly on studying output 
volatility and scarcely on consumption and investment volatility. Recent evidence provided 
by Prasad et al. (2004, Table 4) shows that financial globalization seems to have reduced, 
on average, output and consumption volatility in industrial economies and “less financially 
integrated (LFI)” developing economies; however, they only reduced modestly in “more 
financially integrated (MFI)” developing economies. Even for MFI countries, volatility of 
private consumption raised in the 1990’s relative to the 1980’s.
4 Bekaert et al. (2004) found 
that equity market liberalization and capital account openness are associated with lower 
volatility of consumption, as opposed to what was found by Stiglitz (2000) and Agénor 
(2003). 
       
The main findings of this paper indicate that financial globalization spurs growth, when the 
countries’ income level is controlled, it does not increase macroeconomic volatility, but 
does not reduce it, either. Whether a country belongs to FLAR does not appear to make a 
difference in terms of growth and macroeconomic volatility. However, a strong negative 
effect on the volatility of consumption was found, which might be related to the fact those 
                                                       
4 The positive productivity and output shocks that developing countries faced during the late 1980s and 
1990s, as well as the procyclical nature of capital flows, “appear to have had an adverse impact on 
consumption volatility” in these countries (Ibid., p. 23).      5
countries have an insurer (FLAR) that has helped them to smooth consumption during 
periods of adverse external shocks.      
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two depicts the evolution of 
different indicators of financial globalization for the 43 countries in the sample. Also, it 
shows those indicators against the volatility of the macro aggregates of interest: output, 
income, private consumption, and investment. Section three runs economic growth 
regressions to evaluate the consequences of financial globalization on economic growth. 
Section four estimates a regression model to evaluate the effects on macroeconomic 
volatility. Yearly data covering the period from 1983 to 2003, and alternative econometric 
techniques are used. Finally, section five offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Facts on Financial Globalization, Economic Growth, and Macroeconomic Volatility 
 
In order to measure the effects of financial globalization, our variable of interest, on 
economic growth and macroeconomic volatility, four different sets of indicators will be 
used. The first two consist of official or de jure measures of restrictions on capital account 
transactions. The second set corresponds to de facto, or empirically observed indicators of 
financial globalization. It is important to mention that differences in the enforcement of the 
law among countries may, for example, contribute to explaining differences in the level of 
de facto indicators, even for the same level of de jure indicators, since agents may evade 
the regulation if its enforcement is weak. However, de jure indicators are useful to explain 
the aims of polices adopted regarding the liberalization of the capital account. Moreover, 
even in the absence of formal restrictions on capital transactions, some developing 
countries may present low levels of de facto indicators as a result of the relatively low 
degree of financial globalization.  
 
Concerning  de jure indicators, they are constructed from the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These measures take the 
value of 1 if at least one restriction for a category of “capital transactions” exists, and zero,   6
otherwise. The first indicator (referred to as Fg1), which was taken from Miniane (2004), 
averages the dummies by country and year, for twelve different categories of “capital 
transactions”, plus a dummy for the category “exchange rate structure.”
5 Miniane’s sample 
was extended to also cover the years 2001 through 2003, as well as ten additional 
countries.
6 The second indicator (referred to as Fg2) considers only the twelve categories of 
capital transactions, that is, no categories related to exchange rate regimes are included. As 
discussed by the literature, the type of codification of indicators built from the IMF’s 
reports would imply that different intensities of capital controls are not captured. However, 
the dummy nature of the restriction makes averaging them equivalent to dividing the 
number of transactions subject to controls by the total number of transactions considered in 
the analysis, which is a proxy for the degree of intensity of controls, as in von Hagen and 
Zhou (2005).        
 
Thus, de jure indexes indicate the official decisions regarding openness or closeness of the 
capital account. However, even with a full de jure restriction, countries may be financially 
integrated with the rest of the world. Conversely, countries without official restrictions may 
have a low degree of effective financial integration if competition in the local market, by 
foreigners, is limited due to domestic market risk, lack of a proper financial development 
and regulation, or other economic and institutional reasons. Therefore, the previous 
indicators need to be complemented with measures of effective financial integration. With 
this purpose, we build two indicators: (1) net capital flows as a percentage of GDP (referred  
                                                       
5 These twelve categories refer to purchases and sales, made by residents and non-residents, of the following 
assets: 1) capital market securities which include shares and other participating securities, as well as bonds 
with maturity of more than one year;  2) money market instruments such as certificates of deposit, treasury 
bills with  an original maturity of one year or less; 3) collective investment securities, like mutual funds; 4) 
derivatives and other instruments; 5) commercial credits from private and multilateral financial institutions 
and governments, linked to trade transactions; 6) financial credits; 7) guarantees, sureties, and financial 
backup facilities through authorized intermediaries; 8) direct investment; 9) liquidation of direct investment 
and repatriation of profits; 10) real estate transactions; 11) provisions specific to commercial banks and other 
credit institutions such as reserve requirements in local and foreign currency, lending from abroad to 
residents, lending locally in foreign currency to non-residents and residents, and investments abroad by banks 
and in banks by non-residents; 12) provisions specific to institutional investors, as the foreign asset share in a 
portfolio.    7
to as Fg3), which is the summation of net foreign direct investment, net portfolio equity,  
and net debt accounts from the countries’ balance of payments; and (2) net foreign assets 
(stock) as a percentage of GDP  (referred to as Fg4), following the methodology proposed 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001),
7 which is a proxy of a country’s net international 
wealth. 
 
It is necessary to mention that for estimating purposes, we will use the complement of the 




2.1 De Jure and De Facto Indicators of Financial Globalization and Economic Growth 
 
Figures 1 through 4 show the evolution of alternative de jure and de facto indicators against 
the growth rate of the GDP per capita on constant Purchasing Power Parities, and its 
volatility, for a sample of countries.
9 Series are averaged per year and per group of 
countries. The first three groups of countries correspond to the standard World Bank 
classification, namely, high-income, middle-income, and low-income countries; and the last 
one, to the FLAR member countries, which are all classified by the World Bank as middle-
income countries.
 10  
 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the second de jure indicator (Fg2) against the output 
growth rate. It shows that none of the groups has had its capital account completely opened 
or completely closed. Second, all countries have experienced a capital account 
                                                                                                                                                                   
6 Juan Pablo Fernández, and then Carlos Patiño, worked on extending the sample. The countries additional to 
Miniane’s are Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Thailand, and Venezuela. 
7 This methodology consists on accumulating the different net components of the capital account of a 
country’s balance of payments. We transform the calculations in such a way that an increase in the indicator 
means that the country’s net foreign liabilities increase (net foreign assets decrease).       
8 Thus, for the first two indicators, zero means full controls on the capital account, and one means full 
liberalization. 
9 Henceforth, we will show facts for only some indicators and variables. The complete set of figures is 
available upon request.   8
liberalization process since the beginning of the eighties, which has accelerated from the 
end of that decade. Third, the richer the country, the more open its capital account is. 
Fourth, while high-income and FLAR member countries have continued opening their 
capital account along the period, low-income countries have stopped and middle-income 
nations, excluding FLAR members, have reversed that process. The fact that the latter 
countries reimposed restrictions on capital flows may be related to the international 
financial crises which occurred during the end of the nineties in some of the main emerging 
markets contained in the sample. It is necessary to mention that the FLAR members carried 
out a continuous financial liberalization process through the period, even more rapidly than 
high-income countries. Fifth, there is, at least graphically, a positive relationship between 
financial globalization and economic growth for middle-income and FLAR member 
countries. Unexpectedly, figure 1 shows that for high-income countries, the more 
financially globalized, the less they grow.  
 
Figure 1. De Jure Indicator and Economic Growth 
                                                                                                                                                                   
10 Appendix A.1 shows which country belongs to which group.   9
High Income Middle Income, excluding FLAR
Low Income FLAR


















































































































Figure 2 depicts a scatter plot of the third indicator of financial globalization (Fg3) against 
the output growth rate. It shows a positive association (correlation) between financial 
globalization and growth for high- and middle-income countries, but negative for low-
income countries, and nil for the FLAR members. Notice that for middle-income and 
FLAR countries, there is great dispersion of the observations. For example, for the former 
countries, there could be a situation where they are growing at a rate close to 3.5% and also 
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Figure 2. De Facto Indicator and Economic Growth 
High Income Middle Income, excluding FLAR
Low Income FLAR
Source: Author's own calculations





















































































































































Figure 3 shows the degree of association between de jure indicator Fg2 and the volatility of 
output. There is almost no association between these two variables neither for high-income 
nor low-income countries. On the other hand, there is a strong positive association for 
middle-income and FLAR member countries, especially for the latter ones. As a 
                                                       
11 Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate of a variable, using a rolling window of 
order four.   11
comparison, figure 4 indicates that for high-income and FLAR member countries there is 
no association between net capital flows (Fg3) and the volatility of output; while for 
middle-income and low-income countries there is a strong negative and positive 
relationship, respectively.           
 
Figure 3. De Jure Indicator and Output Volatility 
High Income Middle Income, excluding FLAR
Low Income FLAR
Source: Author's own calculations
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Figure 4. De Facto Indicator and Output Volatility 
High Income Middle Income, excluding FLAR
Low Income FLAR
Source: Author's own calculations


















































































































































In summary, figures 1 through 2 show a positive relationship between financial 
globalization and economic growth for middle-income countries, excluding FLAR’s 
members, and negative for low-income countries. For high-income countries and FLAR’s 
members the relationship is ambiguous. With respect to volatility, figures 3 through 4 
indicate no association between financial globalization and output volatility for high-
income countries. For the other countries, figures show contradictory evidence. Of course, 
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3. Data and Econometrics 
 
First, a standard growth regression model is estimated
12, based on theoretical grounds and 
empirical findings, to evaluate the effects of financial globalization on economic growth. 
Measurements of “state” variables, as proxies for parameters, and variables sought to 
capture macroeconomic reforms (trade and domestic financial liberalizations); economic 
environment; and institutional quality, as explanatory variables are used. Second, a model, 
in the spirit of Razin and Rose (1994), Easterly et al. (2001), and Kose et al. (2003) is 
estimated to quantify the effects of financial globalization on the volatility of output, 
income, consumption, and investment. In both cases, we ran cross-section and panel-data 
regressions using OLS and GLS with robust standard errors. It is worth noting that cross-
section is also implemented for comparative purposes only, most of the literature has used 
that technique, since there are well known the advantages of the panel-data estimations. 
Finally, IV panel-data regressions were run when needed.    
  
The data covers the period from 1984 to 2003 and a sample of 43 countries, among them 
the FLAR member countries.
13 Those four alternative indicators of financial globalization 
explained in Section 2, denoted as Fg1,  Fg2,  Fg3, and Fg4, are used as the interest 
explanatory variables in the estimations.  
 
3.1 Financial Globalization and Growth  
 
Cross-Section Estimations 
The linear cross-section growth regression for the i-th country is the following:  
 
                                                       
12 The theoretical and empirical references on growth models that this paper is based on are in Romer (1986), 
Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Barro and Lee (1996), Sach and 
Warner (1995), Levine (1996, 1997), Rodrick (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Baldwin and Forslid 
(2000), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Klein (2005). 
  
13 Appendix A.2 describes the data, sources, and units of measurement.   14
(1)     
43 ,..., 2 , 1 =
+ + =
i
Gy i i i ε µ δ Z
, 
 
where Gy is the growth rate of the real per capita GDP over the sample period,
14 Zi is a 
1x13  
vector of observations on the explanatory variables, which are either the Fg1 (+), Fg2 (+), 
Fg3 (+), or Fg4 (+) indicators of financial globalization with their respective expected sign 
in parenthesis; real per capita GDP in 1984, y84 (-); literacy rate in 1984, hum84 (+); 
population growth rate, Gp (-); literacy rate, Hum (+); investment as a percentage of GDP, 
Inv (+); and trade openness, Open (+/-), defined as the ratio of exports plus imports to 
GDP;
15 domestic financial depth, Fd  (+), measured by M3 as a percentage of GDP; 
government consumption as a percentage of GDP, Gc (-); institutional quality (+), Icrg (+),  
measured by the Composite Risk Rating of the World Development Indicators; a dummy 
variable for the FLAR member countries, Flar (?); and two interaction variables between 
the financial globalization indicator and the categories ‘high-income country’ and ‘middle-
income country’, I(Fgi*h) and I(Fgi*m)), respectively. δ is a 13x1 vector of parameters of 
the explanatory variables; µ is a constant; and εi is the error term, which is assumed to have 
zero mean, E(εi/Xi)=0, and to be uncorrelated with itself, E(εiεj), i≠j, uncorrelated with Xi, 




Before showing the estimations, some recalls are needed. First, all explanatory variables 
different from the “state” variables were averaged throughout the sample period. Second, 
we included, as a first step, interaction variables that link the financial globalization 
indicators to the different levels of the countries’ (1) per capita income, (2) institutional 
quality, (3) trade openness, (4) financial depth, and (5) size of the government. The only 
interaction variable that resulted statistically significant was income so that the 
                                                       
14 We alternately used the change in the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP between 1983 and 2003 as 
the dependent variable, and the results did not vary significantly. 
15 The more open the economy, the more vulnerable it is to trade shocks (-). However, the more open the 
economy is to trade, the less volatile consumption should be (+).     15
simultaneous presence of financial globalization and high-and-middle income countries 
reinforce the positive effects on growth. Thus, as stated by the literature, the benefits from 
financial globalization seem to be available after the countries’ income attains certain 
threshold. Third, we carried out endogeneity tests on the critical variables Fg3, Fg4, Inv, 
and  Open using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s augmented regression test (Davidson and 
Mackinnon, 1993). The results showed that, at a 5% level of significance, OLS were 
consistent. Moreover, we ran Hausman tests of OLS against an IV-regression and, again, 
OLS resulted consistent. Thus, simple OLS seemed to be the proper econometric technique 
for the cross-section data.
16              
 
Table 1 shows that for the different regressions, unexpectedly, financial globalization 
reduces growth,
17 when the financial globalization measurement fg3 and fg4 are used. Notice 
that, as suggested by the facts, when controlling the countries’ income level, financial 
globalization endorses growth in high- and middle-income countries, as shown by the 
coefficient estimates of the interaction variables I(Fgi*h) and I(Fgi*m) in regression 3. As 
for the standard repressors of growth models such us population growth rate and 
investment, resulted significant and with the expected signs. The financial depthness 
indicator resulted statistically significant, but wrongly singed. The fact that a country 










                                                       
16 For completeness, we ran IV regressions and the results were statistically poor.     16




1 2  3  4 
Fg1  -0.05 
(0.33) 
---- ----  ---- 
Fg2  ---- -0.03 
(0.24) 
---- ---- 
Fg3  ---- ----  -0.10** 
(0.04) 
---- 
Fg4  ---- ----  ----  -0.01* 
(0.08) 








































































































        
Number of observ.  36  36  36  36 









2  0.69 0.67  0.69  0.77 
1 It uses the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator of variance. Gy is the growth rate of the real per capita 
GDP over the sample period; Fg1, Fg2, Fg3, and Fg4 are the indicators of financial globalization; y84 is the 
real per capita GDP in 1984; hum84 is the literacy rate in 1984; Gp is the population growth rate; Hum is the 
literacy rate; Inv is investment as a percentage of GDP; Open is trade openness; Fd is the indicator of 
domestic financial depth; Gc  is government consumption as a percentage of GDP; Icrg is the indicator 
institutional quality; FLAR is a dummy for the FLAR member countries; I(Fgi*h) is the interaction variable 
between the i-th financial globalization indicator and the dummy ‘high-income country’; and I(Fgi*m) is the 
same interaction variable but for ‘middle-income country’ (the base category is ‘low-income country’). All 
explanatory variables but the “state” variables were averaged throughout the sample period. The number in 
parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, 
respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
17 We used STATA V.8.2 for all the calculations. Outputs not shown in the paper are available upon request.   17
 
Panel-Data Estimations 
The linear panel-data growth regression model for the i-th country in the t-th time period is 
the following: 
  
(2)     
4 , 3 , 2 , 1










where variables are defined as before, though they were averaged throughout non-
overlapping five-years intervals (1984-1988; 1989-1993; 1994-1998; 1999-2003).
19 β is a 
13x1 vector of parameters of the explanatory variables; µi is the country-specific effect, 
which is assumed random and i.i.d. with variance σ
2
µ,;
20 υit is the combined time series and 
cross-section error component, which is assumed to have zero mean and to be uncorrelated 
to the variables in Xit.
21 
 
Table 2 shows that only in the case of regression “3”, when indicator Fg3 is used, financial 
globalization reduces growth. For the other cases, financial globalization neither reduces 
nor increases growth. Again, when controlling the countries’ income level, as it is captured 
by the interaction variables, financial globalization promotes growth. Regarding the 
standard repressors, investment, government consumption, and the indicator of institutional 
quality, resulted significant, with the expected signs, as well as robust to changes in the 
financial globalization indicator. Human capital and the financial depthness indicator 
                                                       
18 An overall constant term is added to this model. 
19 We also used ten-year intervals in order to avoid the “noise” introduced by business cycle variation in 
GDP, as argued by Rodriguez and Rodrick (1999). The results did not change significantly.  
20 The randomness of µi was tested using the Hausman test.  
21 Again, we ran endogeneity tests on the variables Fg3, Fg4, Inv, and Open using the standard Hausman’s test 
and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s augmented regression test. None of the tests for any of the variables rejected 
the null hypothesis of no systematic difference in the coefficients, except for the indicator Fg3. Thus, for 
equation “3” we ran an IV panel-data regression.   18
resulted statistically significant, but incorrectly singed. Again, the dummy capturing FLAR 








1 2  3
2 4 
Fg1  0.00 
(0.92) 
---- ----  ---- 
Fg2  ---- -0.02 
(0.26) 
---- ---- 
Fg3  ---- ----  -0.24** 
(0.02) 
---- 
Fg4  ---- ----  ----  -0.00 
(0.13) 








































































































        
Number of observ.  132  132  108  132 
Wald χ









2: Overall  0.43  0.42  0.29  0.43 
1 Variables are defined in table 1. The number in parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean 
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
2 It uses instrumental variables, the G2SLS implementation of Balestra and Varadharajan-Kishnakumar 
(1987), to estimate the two-stage least squares random-effect estimators. The instruments are the real interest   19
rate differentials between domestic and foreign rates, adjusted by the percentage change of the exchange rate 
expectations, and investment as a percentage of GDP in 1984, as well as their lags.  
 
 
3.2 Financial Globalization and Macroeconomic Volatility 
 
Cross-section and panel-data regressions, of the type of equations (1) and (2) are used 
respectively to evaluate the effects of financial globalization on the volatility of output, 
consumption, and investment. Here, the dependent variable will alternately be the average 
volatility of real GDP (output), private consumption, and investment (fixed capital), over 
the sample period. The explanatory variables are averages over the sample period of either 
Fg1 (-), Fg2 (-), Fg3 (-), or Fg4 (-) indicators of financial globalization, with their respective 
expected sign in parenthesis: volatility of investment as a percentage of GDP, Vinv (-), for 
the case of evaluating output volatility; trade openness indicator, Open (+);
22 volatility of 
domestic financial depth indicator, Vfd (+); inflation rate π (+); volatility of government 
consumption as a percentage of GDP, as an indicator of the volatility of fiscal policy, Vgc 
(+); and a dummy variable for the FLAR member countries, Flar (?). 
 
Cross-Section Estimations 
Tables 3-1 and 3-2 report the cross-section results for indicators Fg2 and Fg4, 
respectively.
23 The estimations indicate that financial globalization does not seem to 
increase macroeconomic volatility, as it is commonly stated by policy makers and analysts. 
It does not reduce volatility, either; except for investment. Unexpectedly, investment 
volatility does not increase output volatility. 
 
As expected, inflation consistently increases output volatility. Volatility of government 
consumption increases the volatility of consumption and investment. The findings indicate 
that whether a country belongs to FLAR does not make a difference on macroeconomic 
volatility.        
                                                       
22 The more open the economy is, the less volatile consumption and investment should be.   









Volatility of the growth 














Vinv  -0.02 
(0.94) 
---  --- 






























Constant  1.31 0.38  5.14** 
  (0.59) (0.68) (0.01) 
     
Number of observ.  31  35  35 







2  0.43 0.93 0.85 
      
1 It uses the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator of variance. Fg2 is the second indicator of financial 
globalization; Vinv is volatility of investment as a percentage of GDP, Open is the trade openness indicator, 
Vfd is the volatility of the domestic financial depth indicator, π is the inflation rate; Vgc is the volatility of the 
fiscal policy, Flar is a dummy variable for the FLAR member countries. All variables are averaged 
throughout the sample period. The number in parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean 
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
2 It uses instrumental variables, the G2SLS implementation of Balestra and Varadharajan-Kishnakumar 
(1987), to estimate the two-stage least squares estimators. The instruments are the volatility of the domestic 
real interest rate, the volatility of the real exchange rate, and the real interest rate differentials between 
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Table 3-2: Cross-Section Volatility Regressions for Fg4 Using OLS
1 
Dependent variable: 
Volatility of the growth 














Vinv  0.01 
(0.98) 
---  --- 






























Constant  1.12 0.48  5.01** 
  (0.53) (0.35)  (0.00) 
      
Number of observ.  31  35  35 







2  0.45 0.93  0.85 
      
1 It uses the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator of variance. Variables are defined in table 3-1. The 
number in parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% and 
5% level, respectively. 




Tables 4-1 and 4-2 report the panel data results for indicators Fg2 and Fg4, respectively.
24 
Financial globalization neither increases nor reduces macroeconomic volatility, except for 
the case of investment, where the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, but its  
effect is nil. Volatility of investment and financial depth, inflation, as well as trade 
openness, do increase output volatility. It is worth noting that inflation reduces investment 
volatility, a finding for which we do not have an explanation. Again, volatility of 
                                                       
24 The results for the other two indicators are not reported, but they are available upon request. Again, the 
randomness of µi was tested using the Hausman test 
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government consumption increases the volatility of consumption and investment; however, 
it reduces volatility of output.    
 





Volatility of the growth 














Vinv  0.06** 
(0.00) 
---  --- 






























Constant  1.58**  0.35  4.94** 
  (0.00)  (0.77)  (0.01) 
     
Number of observ.  129  129  129 
Wald χ








  0.32 0.91 0.82 
      
1 It uses instrumental variables, the G2SLS implementation of Balestra and Varadharajan-Kishnakumar 
(1987), to estimate the two-stage least squares random-effect estimators. Variables are defined in table 3-1. 
The number in parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical significance at the 10% 
and 5% level, respectively. 
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An opposite result is found on the dummy capturing FLAR member countries, since it 
seems to have a small positive effect on output volatility, but a large negative effect on 
consumption. An interpretation for this behavior might be that the economies of the FLAR 
members were very unstable during the sample period; however, the fact that they belong 
to that “lender of last resort” might allow those countries to smooth consumption somehow 
and somewhat. Of course, this is a hypothesis that has to be analyzed and proved, which is 
out of the scope of this paper.
25 
               
 
 





Volatility of the growth 














Vinv  0.06** 
(0.00) 
---  --- 






























Constant  1.41**  0.53  5.72** 
  (0.00)  (0.56)  (0.00) 
     
Number of observ.  129  129  129 
Wald χ








  0.33 0.91 0.82 
      
1 As stated in Table 3-1. The number in parenthesis is the p-value. The symbols “*” and “**” mean statistical 




                                                       
25 Machinea and Titelman (2006) seem to offer some support for this argument.   24
 
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the effects of financial globalization on economic 
growth and macroeconomic volatility for a sample of 43 countries, paying particular 
attention to those countries belonging to FLAR. 
 
Regarding growth, the findings indicate that financial globalization endorses growth, once 
the countries’ income level is controlled. This supports the evidence presented by Edison 
(2004), Klein (2005), and Mora and Rincón (2006).  
 
As for macroeconomic volatility, the estimations indicate that financial globalization does 
not seem to increase macroeconomic volatility, as it is commonly thought. In general, it 
does not reduce volatility either, which supports the evidence showed by Mora and Rincón 
(2006) and is against the evidence presented, for example by Prasad et al. (2004). 
 
Whether a country belongs to FLAR or not, does not seem to make a difference in terms of 
growth and macroeconomic volatility. However, it is worth to mention that a strong 
negative effect was found on volatility of consumption, which might be related to the fact 
that those countries have an insurer (FLAR) that has helped them to smooth consumption 
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A.1 Sample of countries 


















United Kingdom South Africa




Source: World Bank. Greece, Korea, and Portugal were reclasified from high-income to
middle-income countries by the author to keep their status along the sample period.  
 
A.2 Data and sources 
Description Units  Source  Observations 
Nominal GDP   Millions of national currency  IMF - IFS 
 
 
Real GDP  Millions of national currency  IMF - IFS  GDP deflator 
(2000=100) 
Nominal GDP   Millions of US dollars  IMF - IFS   




IMF - IFS   
Volatility of the growth rate 
of real GDP 
Standard deviation of the growth 
rate using a four period moving 
window (%) 
Own calculations  
 
GDP in national 
currency 
 
Volatility of the growth rate  Standard deviation of the growth  Own calculations   Government   29
of government consumption   rate using a four period moving 
window (%) 
  consumption  in 
national currency 
deflated by CPI 
Volatility of the growth rate 
of private 
Standard deviation of the growth 
rate using a four period moving 
window (%) 





deflated by CPI  
Volatility of the growth rate 
of real gross fixed capital 
formation 
Standard deviation of the growth 
rate using a four period moving 
window (%) 
Own calculations  
 
GDP deflator used 
Real government 
consumption 
Millions of national currency  IMF - IFS 
 
CPI (2000 = 100) 
 
Real private consumption  Millions of national currency  IMF - IFS 
 
CPI (2000 = 100) 
 
Real gross fixed capital 
formation 




Current account balance  % of GDP  IMF - IFS    
Financial globalization 
indicators  
Dummy averages by country and 
year for twelve different 
categories of “capital 
transactions” 
Miniane (2004) 
IMF’s AREAER,  
and own 
calculations 
de jure indicators 
Foreign direct investment  Millions of US dollars  IMF’s BOP and 
own calculations 
de facto indicator 
 
Net portfolio equity 
investment 
Millions of US dollars 
 
IMF’s BOP and 
own calculations 
 
de facto indicator 
 
Net debt  Millions of US dollars  IMF’s BOP and 
own calculations 
de facto indicator 
 




Ferretti (2001)   
de facto indicator 
 
Exports FOB  Millions of US dollars  IMF – IFS   
Imports CIF  Millions of US dollars  IMF – IFS   
Public and publicly 
guaranteed debt 
% of GDP  IFS & WDI  NGDP in millions 
of US dollars 
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % 
of GDP 
% of GDP  WDI  Financial 
depthness 
indicator 
ICRG composite risk rating  0-100  WDI  Institutional 
quality 
Literacy rate (% People 






Consumer price index  Index (2000 = 100)  IMF - IFS   
GDP deflator  Index (2000 = 100)  IMF - IFS   
Real effective exchange 
rates 
 
Index (2000 = 100)  IMF - IFS   
 
 
VARIABLES USED IN GROWTH ESTIMATIONS   30
Variable Definition 
Gy   Average growth rate of the real per capita GDP over the sample 
period 
Fg1  de jure indicator: dummy averages by country and year for twelve 
different categories of “capital transactions” from the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER), plus a dummy for the category 
“exchange rate structure. 
Fg2  de jure indicator: dummy averages by country and year for twelve 
different categories of “capital transactions” from the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). 
Fg3  Net capital flows as a percentage of GDP 
Fg4   Net foreign assets as a percentage of GDP 
y84  Real per capita GDP in 1984  
hum84  Literacy rate in 1984 (% People ages 15 and above) 
Gp  Growth rate of population  
Hum Literacy  rate 
Inv  Investment as a percentage of GDP  
Open  Indicator of trade openness  
Fd  Indicator of domestic financial depthness 
Gc  Government consumption as a percentage of GDP 
Icrg  Indicator of institutional quality  
Flar  Dummy variable for the FLAR’s member countries 
I(Fgi*h)  Interaction variable between the i-th financial globalization 
indicator and the category ‘high-income country’ 
I(Fgi*m)  Interaction variable between the i-th financial globalization 
indicator and the category ‘middle-income country’ 
 
VARIABLES USED IN VOLATILITY ESTIMATIONS 
Variable Definition 
Vy  Volatility of the growth rate of real GDP  
Vc  Volatility of the growth rate of real private consumption  
Vinv  Volatility of the growth rate of real gross fixed capital formation 
Fg1  de jure indicator: dummy averages by country and year for twelve different 
categories of “capital transactions” from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), plus a dummy for the 
category “exchange rate structure. 
Fg2  de jure indicator: dummy averages by country and year for twelve different 
categories of “capital transactions” from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Fg3  Net capital flows as a percentage of GDP 
Fg4   Net foreign assets as a percentage of GDP 
Open  Indicator of trade openness  
Vfd  Volatility of the indicator of domestic financial depthness 
π  Inflation rate 
Vgc  Volatility of the growth rate of real government consumption 
Flar   Dummy variable for the FLAR’s member countries 
 